

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

0973

VP 6a

INDICATE: ☐ CABLE ☐ TELETYPE
 CHARGE TO: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 BY: JF- NARS, Date 11/31/77

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NOV 5 10 59 PM '62

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1200

EYES ONLY FOR STEVENSON AND MCCLOY

EYES ONLY

As indicated in Deptel 1194, we want to be able to see and count for ourselves departing ^{missiles} ~~missiles~~ and associated equipment and ~~that~~ there is in procedures promise/~~to procedure~~ suggested by Kuznetsov provided it is clear that alone reliable observation, not Soviet photography ~~alone~~, is essential.

In this connection, following is guidance as followup ~~recommendations~~ suggestions by Kuznetsov, indicating kind of inspection procedure we believe would be necessary to check outgoing cargoes. Procedures worked out by inter-agency panel. We would strongly prefer QTE on board UNQTE procedure but prepared to accept QTE along side UNQTE procedure if necessary provided equipment is on top of deck. In discussing these procedures with Kuznetsov you should make clear our continued insistence on ^{UN ground} ~~on~~ inspection in Cuba to guard against ~~re-introduction of offensive weapons~~ reintroduction of offensive weapons.

1. Problem

EYES ONLY

11/5/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Capt. Zammalt IO:JMP:JJSisco:me

IO - Marian Cleveland

G - Mr. Johnson (draft)
 S/S - Mr. Grant

Defense Mr. Mitze (subs)

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~~Classification~~

1. Problem. Recommend a procedure which will provide adequate verification that the USSR has in fact removed offensive equipment from Cuba.

2. Background.

3. Frame of Reference

a. The USSR is expected to have complied fully with the commitments undertaken in paragraphs c, d, and f above.

b. In addition, it is expected that the USSR will have

complied ~~complied~~

~~Classification~~

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complied with the position of the U.S. Government that IL28s are also to be removed from Cuba as offensive equipment.

c. The commitment to remove missiles is considered to include such as appear on the list at the end of this message. the removal of/associated items/~~such as launching pads, tracked launchers, mobile launchers, missile transporters, trucks, container cranes, missile fuel and oxidizers, fuel tank trailers, wheeled prime movers, fuel vehicles, oxidizer tank trailers, wheelbarrows, launch stands, power generators, electronic equipment, and other related equipment.~~

d. Photos of weapon crates or empty missile sites can be falsified as to time or location and therefore, although of value, are not foolproof.

e. The U.S. Government ~~has~~ needs to determine how Soviets propose to demonstrate no nuclear warheads or bombs remain in Cuba.

f. The question of fighter-bombers, KOMAR motor torpedo boats and missile fuel has not been answered.

4. Required Verification in Cuban Ports

a. Inspection of equipment prior to loading is much to be preferred over inspection after loading on board ship.

b. Although from the standpoint of verification it is preferable that inspection of all components should take place prior to crating, nevertheless, reasonable assurance of removal (which gives consideration to the concern of the USSR re espionage) can be achieved without inspection before crating.

c. Sufficient

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c. Sufficient uncrating should be accomplished to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and ~~photo~~ photography.

5. Required Verification at Sea

a. Loading of Soviet ships will be carried out in such fashion that visual inspection of each crate is feasible. As an alternative, there could be partial unloading at another designated port to allow visual ~~insp~~ inspection. In either event a loading plan for each outgoing vessel will be provided to facilitate inspection. This is to be a detailed plan giving location and identify of offensive weapons components.

b. Soviet ships will be instructed to rendezvous with U.S. inspection vessels and to have completed appropriate uncrating in advance of rendezvous. In the event weather makes such uncrating infeasible, a delay in time or change of rendezvous will be signalled by the inspecting ship.

c. Inspection on Board

1. This form of inspection is much to be preferred over inspection from along side and should be requested.

2. If the USSR has located any of its offensive equipment below deck, on board access to these ships will be mandatory in order to obtain adequate verification.

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A LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT SPECIAL MISSILE EQUIPMENT

TO BE USED IN MAKING UP A CHECK-OFF LIST

1. Missiles and missile transporter
2. Tracked prime mover for transporter
3. Erector vehicles
4. Fuel tank trailers
5. Wheeled prime movers for fuel vehicles
6. Oxidizer tank trailers
7. Tracked prime movers for oxidizer trailers
8. Launch stands
9. Power generators
10. Electronics vans
11. Theodolites on Pedistals

RIISK

END

Note: Passed to Principle Officers Executive Committee

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